Abstract: This study explores whether and to what extent voters expect the government to provide jobs for everyone who wants to work. It examines the link between voter expectations and the labour market situation. It finds that the stronger the expectation of the government to provide a job for everyone in the mid-1990s was, the worse the labour market situation is today. Two hypotheses inspired by the theory of public choice are proposed to explain this relationship: (1) societal expectations were not correlated with reforms of labour market institutions in the next two decades; (2) support for the idea of the government providing a job for everyone was significantly lower among the employed (who in many countries constituted the majority of voters) than among other groups, and this difference did not depend on the labour market situation. The empirical analysis is based on a set of 29 indicators of labour market institutions and covers countries included in the Role of Government survey for 1996-2016 -conducted as part of the International Social Survey Programme. The obtained results are largely consistent with the stated hypotheses.
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Introduction
There are many studies that underline the importance of labour market institutions for the situation on the labour market [Boeri et al., 2015; Boeri, Van Ours, 2008; OECD, 2006] , especially when it comes to its capability to absorb negative macroeconomic shocks [Blanchard, Wolfers, 2000; OECD, 2012] . However, much less is known about why these institutions are (or are not) reformed and to what extent some regulations may be socially desired despite their negative impact on the labour market [Boeri, 2010] . Surprisingly, although a growing number of studies have attempted to answer these questions [Boeri et al., 2012; Lucifora, Moriconi, 2015; Vindigni et al., 2015] , few researchers have analysed the empirical data describing the expectations of labour market participants concerning the conducted policy [Alesina et al., 2015; Parlevliet, 2017] . Therefore, the goal of this study is to assess to what extent individual preferences may help to explain the heterogeneity of labour market institutions among countries over a period of 10 to 20 years and to analyse how strongly the current labour market situation affects these preferences.
The research is based on the Role of Government survey, which has been conducted five times for various countries, mostly highly developed ones (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a detailed list). The answer to the following question was treated as a main measure of individual preferences: On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one? The analysis in the next section reveals a surprising relationship between answers to this question in 1996 and labour market outcomes in individual countries in 2012-2016. It turns out that the stronger the support for a full-employment policy among respondents was, the worse the current labour market outcomes are.
Many potential explanations can be proposed to explain this relationship. However, this study was focused on two complementary hypotheses that can be falsified empirically. They are formulated in the second section and falsified in the third and fourth sections. The third section presents the results of a correlation analysis between respondents' answers in the third wave (conducted predominantly in 1996) of the Role of Government study and labour market institutions at the time when the survey was conducted and two decades later. Meanwhile, the fourth section is devoted to a detailed analysis of the respondents' answers with the use of a multilevel logit model. The last section concludes. The Appendix presents the characteristics of the variables and details of the Role of Government survey.
Societal expectations and labour market outcomes How individual preferences were measured
The study is based on the Role of Government survey, which was first carried out in 1985 as part of the International Social Survey Programme [ISSP Research Group, 1992 , 1999 , 2018 . The survey was conducted mainly for highly developed countries, though some post-socialist and developing countries were also included. As the list of covered countries differed in each wave, it is presented in detail in Table  A1 in the Appendix (with the exception of the first wave, which covered only six countries). The list, however, is not long, because the 3 rd wave covered 24 countries, the 4 th was conducted for 33, while the 5 th wave comprised 28 countries. Therefore, in order to preserve as many observations as possible, it was decided not to exclude particular countries from the presented study to obtain an invariant geographic scope in the analysed period, but rather to conduct the estimates for all available observations in the particular waves.
This approach is justified by the fact that, depending on the type of the conducted analysis, various waves were employed in the study. The correlation analysis with current labour market outcomes presented in the following subsection was conducted with the help of the third and fourth waves respectively. The correlation analysis with labour market institutions, presented in the third section, was based on the third wave, which ensured both a long period of analysis (around two decades) and a satisfactory number of country observations. Finally, the analysis of individual data was predominantly based on the largest, fourth, wave, however, the third and fifth waves were also analysed as robustness checks.
In order to measure individual preferences, the following question was asked: On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one? Respondents could choose from among the following answers: Definitely should be, Probably should be, Probably should not be, and Definitely should not be. Table A2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of answers to this question in each country and its connection with other questions in the survey 4 . This descriptive analysis reveals that respondents who chose Definitely should be or Probably should be were also in favour of making the government responsible for keeping prices under control, providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed, reducing income differences, and helping industry to grow. Moreover, they also urged greater spending on old-age pensions and unemployment benefits even at the expense of higher taxes. Thus, it can be conjectured that most respondents have in fact expressed their expectation to increase state interventionism by stating in the survey that they support the idea of providing a job for everyone.
2
In some countries, the surveys were conducted a year or two earlier or later than stated in the article. However, the ISSP uses the dates 1990, 1996, 2006 and 2016 to title the waves. Therefore, this article will also cite these approximate dates to denote when the study was conducted.
3
As of this writing (June 2018), only preliminary results of the last wave were available. 4 It was decided to present these results only for the largest, fourth, wave. The same analysis was conducted for the third wave of the survey, which yielded similar results.
Correlation between societal expectations and labour market outcomes
Not surprisingly, responses to the question measuring individual preferences proved to be significantly correlated with the unemployment rate in the year when the study was conducted (see Figure 1 , which is based on the 3 rd wave conducted in 1996). Generally, the higher the unemployment rate when the study was conducted, the stronger was the expectation of the government to provide a job for everyone. Reponses to the question chosen to measure individual preferences also proved to be strongly correlated with current labour market outcomes. Table 1a presents estimates of the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients for eight indicators of such outcomes and the percentage of survey respondents who agreed with the statement that the government should provide a job for everyone (Table A3 in the Appendix presents the definitions and sources of the variables employed in the analysis). Table 1b shows analogous estimates of correlations for changes in labour market outcomes between the current period and the years when the study was conducted.
The obtained results reveal that there is a significant correlation between societal expectations of the government providing a job for everyone-expressed in 1996 or 2006-and the current employment-to-population ratio, labour force participation rate, unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate as well as unemployment among youth and the percentage of employees who do not worry about losing their job. Table A1 , while the definitions and sources of variables are given in Table A3 in the Appendix. Table 1a .
Source: see Table 1a .
Moreover, as the results presented in Table 1b indicate, societal expectations did not lead to any significant change in the situation over the years. It can therefore be concluded that societal expectations of the government to provide a job for everyone did not translate into any noticeable progress in achieving the aim of full employment in countries covered by the Role of Government survey over the years.
Research hypotheses
The public choice literature gives many suggestions as to why the government may fail to satisfy the needs of labour market participants. First, expectations may be impossible to meet due to economic constraints [Drazen, 2000: 622-624] . In many cases, only the second-best solutions can be implemented on a labour market characterised by more severe informational asymmetries, externalities, search frictions and structural mismatches than other markets [Boeri, Van Ours, 2008: 19] . Moreover, some policies might be difficult to implement due to their costs. This may especially be the case in post-socialist countries [Cazes, Nesporova, 2003; Lehmann, Muravyev, 2012] where expectations of state interventionism are the highest (see Figure 1 or Table 3 ). Governments have also faced the problem of incomplete information. During the last 20 years many contradictory recommendations have been formulated concerning government policy on the labour market [Blanchard et al., 2006; Boeri et al., 2015; European Commission, 2006; Keune, Serrano, 2014; Méda, 2014] . As a result, decision makers have received conflicting signals about an optimal policy. This problem is strengthened by interaction effects between various institutions [Algan, Cahuc, 2009; Lehmann, Muravyev, 2012; Woźniak-Jęchorek, 2013] . This means that the introduction of the same regulations may have a different impact on labour market outcomes in various countries, depending on already existing labour market institutions, both formal and informal.
What's more, the required reforms might have been opposed by influential interest groups. In the case of the labour market, it is often assumed that the strongest pressure on the government can be put by the employed [Lucifora, Moriconi, 2015; Neugart, 2008; Saint-Paul, 1996] . It is argued that this group is against reforms aimed at increasing the employability of outsiders when they expect that these changes may increase their affective job insecurity 5 or decrease their net wages. In consequence, governments often decide to propose limited reforms targeted at the margin of the labour market [Boeri, Garibaldi, 2007; Curto-Grau, 2017; Eichhorst, Marx, 2011; Emmenegger, 2014: 195-275] .
The presented theoretical considerations make it possible to formulate the first hypothesis stating that societal expectations concerning the government's 5 Following Anderson and Pontusson [2007] , affective job insecurity is understood as the extent to which an individual worries about losing a job. It is a function of three elements: an individual's estimate of the probability of losing a job, an estimate of the probability of finding another job, and access to sources of income that do not depend on finding another job. responsibility to provide a job for everyone expressed around 1996 were not significantly correlated with labour market institution reforms over the two decades that followed.
However, some authors argue that employed voters have in fact various levels of affective job insecurity and, in consequence, different policy preferences [Anderson, Pontusson, 2007] . The level of job insecurity depends on personal characteristics, especially job-specific and general human capital [Saint-Paul, 2002; Vindigni et al., 2015] , the type of employment contract [Clark, PostelVinay, 2009 ], someone's occupation and the sector in which they operate [Fossati, 2014] , and labour market institutions [Anderson, Pontusson, 2007; Giannelli et al., 2012] . The sense of job insecurity may also depend on the current labour market situation [Berglund et al., 2014; Blekesaune, 2007; Singer, 2013] . This means that the difference between some employed voters and other labour market participants in how they view reforms may decrease as the economic situation changes. As a result, decision makers may have the opportunity to go ahead with reforms that were previously blocked by rigid political constraints.
However, in order to explain the relationship between societal preferences and labour market outcomes described in the previous subsection, it may be assumed that the interaction between the preferences of the employed and the current labour market situation has little significance and that these preferences are predominantly determined by the personal characteristics of individuals that are largely time-invariant. In consequence, the second research hypothesis indicates that the employed support the idea of the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone to a significantly lesser extent than other groups of voters and that this difference does not depend on the current situation on the labour market. This means that even during an economic downturn there is no majority that has one common preference related to what state intervention should look like on the labour market, which allows the government to propose only limited reforms, if any.
Societal expectations and labour market institutions
The next step of the analysis was based on a set of 29 indicators of labour market institutions. The aim was to verify whether individual support for providing a job for everyone expressed around 1996 was correlated with the labour market institutional framework existing at the time of the survey as well as with the current framework. Another objective was to assess the correlation with changes in that framework between these two moments. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2 , while a description of the variables is given in Table A3 in the Appendix.
The analysis was based on the third wave of the study, because the previous waves were conducted for an insufficient number of countries (six countries in the 1 st wave, nine in the 2 nd ). Meanwhile, the fourth wave was carried out just before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, and it may be argued that some socially expected reforms could not be introduced after this wave, not so much due to a lack of political consensus, but because of economic constraints. Moreover, as the OECD [2012] indicates, the responsiveness of the labour market situation in particular countries to the crisis was determined by the institutional framework existing before 2008. Thus, it was decided to base this analysis exclusively on the third wave (conducted in 1996), which ensured both a long period of analysis (around two decades) and an acceptable amount of country observations (see Table 2 for details). Note: Spearman -Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, Pearson -Pearson's correlation coefficient, N -number of observations. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** -0.01, ** -0.05, * -0.1. The correlation coefficients were estimated for the percentage of respondents that chose the answer Definitely should be or Probably should be to the question whether the government should be responsible for providing a job for everyone in the 3 rd wave of the survey (1996) . Analogous estimates were conducted for the percentage of respondents who declared only that the government Definitely should be responsible for providing a job for everyone. The results were similar and are available upon request. Changes in labour market institutions were estimated as inst t /inst t-τ where inst t is the contemporary value of an institutional indicator and inst t-τ describes the institution in 1996. The exceptions were EPL, EPR, EPT, EPC, National min. wage and Coord. of wage setting, where the differences were expressed as inst t -inst t-τ in order to avoid dividing by zero.
The third wave of the Role of Government survey was conducted for 24 countries. However, it was not possible to collect the values for all institutional indicators for all of these countries in 1996 and 2015. Therefore, it was decided to collect data also for some surrounding years. The column "Years of obs." indicates the years of earliest and latest observation for each calculation. Moreover, it was decided not to calculate several-year averages for individual institutions because in many cases such averages would have been calculated only with the use of a single year's observation, which has no justification. Source: Own elaboration. The list of the analysed countries is presented in Table A1 , while the definitions and sources of the variables are given in Table A3 in the Appendix.
However, the number of observations was still perceived as too small to employ complex econometric models. As a result, it was decided once more to estimate the cross-country correlation coefficients. Although the correlation analysis does not make it possible to reveal the underlying cause-and-effect relationship, it can be used to falsify the first hypothesis. That is because such analysis makes it possible to identify some common cross-country patterns, for instance the adoption of a policy consistent with the "flexicurity" approach. Such an approach was recommended by the OECD as early as 1994 [OECD, 1994] and by the European Commission in the 2000 s [2006, 2007] . Therefore, it can be assumed that it was known to all governments in the analysed period and could be introduced by all of them in response to the societal expectation to provide a job for everyone. The identification of such a pattern would be an argument to reject the first hypothesis. Moreover, the correlation analysis makes it possible to indicate which institutions can be a promising subject for further, more detailed, analysis that would allow researchers to reveal the underlying cause-and-effect relationships.
In the presented study, it was possible to calculate changes in a set of 20 indicators over a period of at least 10 years (see Table 2a for the full list of indicators and Table A3 in the Appendix for the definitions and sources). Only three of the 20 indicators turned out to be significantly correlated with the societal expectations to provide a job for everyone expressed in 1996. The indicators included employment protection legislation for employees working on regular contracts (EPR), union density, and expenditure on active labour market policy (ALMP). However, the result for this last indicator is only confirmed by the Spearman rank correlation coefficient and only at the 0.1 significance level.
Although the relationship with changes in employment protection legislation between 1996 and 2013 is negative, it can still be stated that the higher the support for providing a job for everyone around 1996 was, the greater was the strictness of firing and hiring regulations in both 1996 and 2013 (see Table 2b and 2c). The relationship with the contemporary strictness of labour market regulations is also confirmed by a statistically significant correlation with other indicators: LMR, LFI, GC hiring and firing, GC labour relations and GC pay to productivity (see Table 2c for the results and Table A3 in the Appendix for precise definitions). This suggests that, although some governments have tried to follow the recommendations of many economists and organisations [Boeri, 2010; European Commission, 2006; Kwiatkowski, Włodarczyk, 2017] and increased labour market flexibility, their efforts have not substantially decreased the differences among countries in terms of hiring and firing regulations. Table 2a , except that the estimates were conducted for the institutional indicators in and around 1996, and not for changes in the indicators. Sources: see Table 2a .
As far as the relationship with active labour market policy is concerned, increasing expenditure on this type of policy may be seen as a way of satisfying individual expectations to provide a job for everyone. At the same time, these expectations turned out to be positively and significantly correlated with the level of taxes (variable Tax in Table 2b and 2c). Although taxes are needed to finance labour market policy, a high tax wedge may be counterproductive as far as the aim of providing a job for everyone is concerned 6 [Nickell, 2006] . 6 It should, however, be noted that the effects of the tax wedge also depend on its structure [Boeri, Van Ours, 2008: 81-100] . This is not captured by the Tax variable, which measures the tax wedge
Moreover, a detailed analysis reveals that the relationship with changes in ALMP is driven by the Czech Republic and Hungary, because it becomes insignificant when these two countries are removed from the data set. The results also indicate that there is a negative relationship with changes in the union density rate (UD), but a detailed analysis of the data reveals that this is a consequence of a significant decrease in union membership in the postsocialist countries during the transition period [Lehmann, Muravyev, 2012] . In the case of changes in other institutions, the correlation coefficients proved to be small and insignificant. As a result, the governments' response to voter expectations expressed in the analysed countries in 1996 can be evaluated as limited. It predominantly focused on decreasing differences among countries in terms of employment protection legislation for permanent contracts and (in some cases) increasing expenditure on active labour market policy, an only for a typical employee. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the high level of the Tax variable necessarily meant a low level of employment in the analysed countries.
approach that can be interpreted as an attempt to adopt a "flexicurity" policy. However, societal expectations did not prove to be significantly correlated with changes in the 17 other institutional indicators that were also analysed. Therefore, it can be concluded that these arguments are not robust although the obtained results give some arguments to reject the first hypothesis stating that societal expectations expressed in the survey in 1996 were not correlated with labour market institution reforms in the next two decades.
Who wants to provide a job for everyone?
Data and Methods
The aim of the next step of analysis was to check whether those employed were significantly less supportive than other groups of voters of the idea that the government should provide a job for everybody, and whether this difference depended on the current labour market situation.
The study was predominantly based on individual data obtained from the largest, fourth, wave (conducted around 2006) of the Role of Government survey [ISSP Research Group, 2008] and covered more than 37,000 respondents from 33 countries. However, this analysis was also carried out, as a robustness check, for the smaller third and fifth waves (conducted in 1996 and 2016 respectively). As of this writing (June 2018), only preliminary data (with many missing observations) for the fifth wave were available. Moreover, it may be argued that the societal expectations expressed in 2016 were not representative of the whole analysed period of 1996-2016. Therefore, despite the fact that the fifth wave is more up to date, it was not used as a basis for the main estimates.
Originally, the dependent variable was an ordinal variable with four categories. However, in some countries the number of respondents that chose the answer Definitely should not be was so small that it was decided to combine it with the answer Probably should not be. As a result, only three possible categories of the dependent variable were analysed: Definitely should be, Probably should be, and Probably or definitely should not be.
The data set has a hierarchical structure where the dependent variable can vary both among countries (level 2) and among individuals within countries (level 1). The sources of the employed variables are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix along with a short description. The main models rely on the two main variables defined at the country level: legal origins and the relative unemployment rate. The legal origin indicators are taken from a study by La Porta et al. [1999] , which, in contrast to later work by these authors [La Porta et al., 2008] , brings together all post-socialist countries into one group. The relative unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of the unemployment rate in the year when the study was conducted to its average level in individual countries in the 1990-2004 period. Thus, the relative unemployment rate makes it possible to assess to what extent the current labour market situation is worse (or better) than a typical one. Among individual-level variables, the following socio-demographic characteristics were included: age, gender, years of education, and household size. Moreover, the models include the respondents' subjective assessment of their position on the social ladder, trade union membership, and the fact of voting in the last elections. Finally, there is also a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a respondent is employed full time or part time, and the value of zero in other cases. In 25 of the 33 analysed countries, the group of the employed constituted more than 50 percent of the respondents.
To precisely capture the heterogeneity of the data set, a multilevel model was estimated, namely the cumulative logit random intercept model [Agresti, 2010: 282-283; Grilli, Rampichini, 2012; Hedeker, 2008] :
where i denotes individuals, j represents countries, and c identifies categories of the dependent variable Y ij (the third category is redundant in the model). Vector x consists of explanatory variables defined both at the country and individual levels. It does not contain category index c, which means that the effects of the regressors are constant across response categories. Variable α c is called a threshold (or cutpoint) between categories c and c + 1. The greater the expression x ij ′ β the higher the probability that respondent i belongs to category c + 1 or higher. Thus, each parameter β has the same direction of effect as the regression parameter in the ordinary linear regression. Moreover, in order to identify α 1 and α 2 , the vector of the explanatory variables does not contain the constant term. Finally, u j is a random effect representing the unobserved factors at the country level. It affects the thresholds for each country so that the set of thresholds for each j is equal to α c − u j , c = 1, 2. The random effect is assumed to have a normal N(0, σ u 2 ) distribution, and its variance σ u 2 is estimated with the model. This makes it possible to estimate the proportion of the between-countries variance with respect to the total variance, which is called the interclass correlation coefficient, because it is also a measure of the correlation between two responses from the same country:
Results
The main results of the estimation are presented in Table 3 , while the robustness checks are shown in the next subsection. The results indicate that the greatest support for the idea that the government should be responsible for providing a job for everyone, exists in post-socialist countries. Slightly less support can be observed in countries with French and Scandinavian legal systems, while substantially less support is present in states with German and English legal traditions. These results to a large extent replicate the classical taxonomy of European countries in terms of social policy systems [EspingAndersen, 1990 ] and confirm the relationship with employment protection legislation since legal origins are considered as its determinant [Botero et al., 2004] . The values of ICC indicate that the between-countries variance constitutes less than 10 percent of the total variance, which suggests that there is little justification to add more country-level variables and that support for the idea to provide a job for everyone is diversified mainly among particular respondents rather than countries.
The results for individual variables indicate that the idea that the government should provide a job for everyone has less support among the employed, older and better educated men than among younger women with a short period of education and without a job. Moreover, the results indicate that providing a job for everyone receives more support from voters with large households and those who believe they are placed at the bottom of the social ladder. This makes it possible to conjecture that the higher the individual's economic insecurity, the higher his or her support for state interventionism [Blekesaune, 2007; Fossati, 2014; Singer, 2013 ]. What's more, support is greater among respondents who did not vote in the last elections. This last finding suggests that the social pressure on governments to provide a job for everyone may in fact be weaker than suggested by the survey because supporters of this idea are reluctant to be politically active.
In the case of the relative unemployment rate, both its average influence on the dependent variable and its interaction with the employment dummy were assessed (Models 1 and 2 respectively). It turned out that the worse the current labour market situation, the higher the support for the idea of the government providing a job for everyone. However, the interaction with the employed appears to be insignificant. The obtained parameter is only 0.044. As the highest value of the relative unemployment rate in the data set was 1.5 (in the case of Portugal), the highest possible marginal effect of the variable "employed" on the dependent variable was −0.266 + 0.044·1.5 = −0.2, which is very close to the average effect obtained in Model 1 (−0.22). This indicates that there is no substantial difference between how the employed and other groups of respondents react to the labour market situation. The result is consistent with the second hypothesis that the employed are less supportive than other groups of the idea that the government should provide a job for everyone and that this difference does not depend on the current labour market situation. Number of countries (level 2 units) 33
Number of observations (level 1 units) 37022
Note: asterisks denote significance: *** -0.01, ** -0.05, * -0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: Own elaboration with the use of the GLLAMM programme [Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004] . Variables' definitions and sources are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix.
Robustness checks
Several robustness checks were conducted, the results of which are shown in Tables 4-7. The first group of checks (Models 3.1-3.3 in Table 4 ) concentrated on applying different measures of the labour market situation. The unemployment rate, the average unemployment rate over the period of 1990-2004, and the ratio of the unemployment rate in the year in which the study was conducted to that in the previous year (unemployment rate change) were used.
Among these variables, the interaction term with the unemployment rate and its average level was found to be statistically significant, but only at the 0.1 level. Moreover, the value of the estimated parameter is equal to 0.007 and 0.006, which means that the unemployment rate and its average level would have to be 40% and 47% respectively to make the expectations of the employed indistinguishable from the preferences of other groups. This result may suggest that the difference in preferences between the employed and other groups in countries with a traditionally high level of unemployment is smaller than in countries with a traditionally low level of unemployment, but that does not allow the conclusions stated in the previous section to be rejected. This is further corroborated by analogous estimates (available upon request) for the employment-to-population ratio instead of the unemployment rate.
The next group of checks focused on changes in the way the group of the employed is measured (Models 4.1-5.2 in Table 4 ). First, only those employed full time were included and once more the interaction term turned out to be insignificant while the obtained parameter was relatively small. Second, instead of employed individuals a broader group of respondents who voted in the last elections was analysed. In this case, the interaction term was found to be significant at the 0.1 level, but once more, even for the highest value of the relative unemployment rate in the data set (1.5), the expectations of the group that voted last elections were still lower than those of other respondents.
Further checks concentrated on excluding particular country groups from the data set using the legal origins variable (Models 6.1-6.5 in Table 5 ). The main model and its modifications were estimated using data from the third wave of the survey conducted in 1996 (Table 6 ). Although the difference in expectations between the employed and other groups vary for individual estimates, the main conclusion is the same for all of them: there is a significant difference between the employed and other groups in terms of support for the idea that the government should provide a job for everyone, and this difference does not depend significantly on the labour market situation. Note: see Table 3 . Source: see Table 3 . Note: see Table 3 . Source: see Table 3 . 
Number of countries 24
Number of observations 30429 a Calculated for the period 1991-1995. Note: see Table 3 . Source: see Table 3 . Note: see Table 3 . Source: see Table 3 .
Finally, as the last check, estimates were carried out for the last wave dating from 2016 (Table 7) . As not all the observations for this wave have been published as of this writing (June 2018), these results must be treated with caution. They turned out to be ambiguous and quite surprising because they indicate (Models 8.3 and 8.5) that the higher the unemployment rate (or its average value), the greater the differences among the employed and other groups of voters. At the same time, they indicate (Model 8.4) that the expectations of the employed may be closer to those of other groups after a rise in the unemployment rate. Although these models should be re-estimated once the final data set from the fifth wave is published, even those preliminary results indicate that there are significant differences between the employed and other groups as far as the role of the state in the labour market is concerned.
Conclusion
A simple model indicating that formal institutions are reformed by the government in order to adjust them to voter preferences fails to explain why some countries sustain institutions that have a negative labour market impact. In tackling this problem, the literature offers approaches such as a cross-country regression between labour market institutions and other country-specific characteristics. Also available is a detailed analysis of individual preferences concerning government policy. However, there is a lack of studies that would try to assess to what extent differences in these preferences have shaped the heterogeneity of labour market institutions and outcomes among countries over a decade or two. This study aimed to fill this gap.
The results indicate that the more supportive voters in various countries were back around 1996 for the idea of the government providing a job for everyone, the worse labour market outcomes can be observed nowadays. Two complementary explanations of this relationship are offered in this study.
First, it has been found that only three of the 20 labour market institution indicators analysed turned out to be correlated with the societal expectations expressed around 1996. Among these, a correlation between the decreasing strictness of permanent employment contract protection and increasing expenditure on active labour market policies was interpreted as governmental action consistent with people expecting the government to provide a job for everyone. However, these efforts were insubstantial because the societal expectations were found to be significantly correlated with employment protection legislation in 2013, in much the same way as in 1996.
Second, the Role of Government survey shows that support for the idea of the government providing a job for everyone is much smaller among the employed (who in many countries constitute the majority of respondents) than in other groups. Moreover, this difference does not significantly depend on the current labour market situation. In consequence, contrary to some theoretical models, the study suggests that, even during an economic downturn, there are substantial differences among voters as to what government policy should look like on the labour market. This hinders substantial reform.
The main recommendation for further research is to repeat the analysis when the final results of the fifth wave of the Role of Government survey are available. This will make it possible to assess to what extent individual expectations have changed since the global crisis. It would be also recommended to compute more detailed indicators of occupational and local labour markets to more precisely gauge respondents' sense of job insecurity. 
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